

whom, how the allegedly stolen material fits the definition of copyrighted material, or how the material was stolen.

Plaintiff also alleges that defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 2319. However, because plaintiff makes absolutely no allegations regarding this statute other than to state that “Defendants [sic] violation falls under 18 USC § 2319,” this claim fails to state a valid claim.

As part of its RICO claims, plaintiff also alleges that defendants violated the Hobbs Act “by preventing Medical Supply’s entry into commerce under color of official right,” citing to 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Section 1951 prohibits the obstruction, delay or affection of commerce by robbery or extortion. Significantly, extortion is defined as the “wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, under color of official right.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). Here, there is no allegation that defendants, who are private parties, acted under color of official right, or acted with any force, violence or fear. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim under the Hobbs Act fails to state a claim.

**e. USA PATRIOT Act (Count XVI)**

Plaintiff alleges that all defendants, through defendants US Bancorp NA and U.S. Bank National Association, violated two sections of the USA PATRIOT Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 1030, by “maliciously” filing a suspicious activity report regarding plaintiff and its founder Samuel Lipari. No private cause of action exists to enforce the USA PATRIOT Act. *Medical Supply I*, 112 Fed. Appx. at 731. Therefore, plaintiff’s USA PATRIOT Act claims are dismissed.

**f. State Law Claims**

Federal district courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are part of the “same case or controversy” as federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “[W]hen a district court dismisses the federal

claims, leaving only the supplemental state claims, the most common response has been to dismiss the state claim or claims without prejudice.” *United States v. Botefuhr*, 309 F.3d 1263, 1273 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) (quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). Having dismissed each of plaintiff’s federal claims, this court finds no compelling reason to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismisses them without prejudice.

## 2. Issue/Claim Preclusion

Several defendants argue that issue and/or claim preclusion bar several of plaintiff’s claims. Claim and issue preclusion are rules of “fundamental and substantial justice that enforce[] the public policy that there be an *end* to litigation.” *May v. Parker-Abbott Transfer & Storage, Inc.*, 899 F.2d 1007, 1009 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Claim and issue preclusion serve to “avoid[] unnecessary expense and vexation for parties, conserve[] judicial resources, and encourage[] reliance on judicial action.” *Id.*

Under the doctrine of issue preclusion, “[w]hen an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” *Botefuhr*, 309 F.3d at 1282 (quoting *Ashe v. Swenson*, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)).

Four elements must be demonstrated in order to trigger issue preclusion: “(1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) the prior action has been fully adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.”

*Id.* at 1282 (quotations omitted).